MILITARY
By Giovanni de Briganti
V-22: It’s Time to Move On
The V- 22 Osprey has had a long, expensive and very chequered history, and in addition to highly publicized—and very deadly—
crashes it has suffered more than its
share of criticism. So, initial reports
from the Marine Corps about its glowing
performance in Iraq were received as a
sign that one of modern aviation’s most
intriguing concepts had finally matured.
Of course, we should have known better. A study of the Iraq deployments by
the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), and June 23 hearings by the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, laid bare the sorry truth: the
V- 22 seriously underperformed in Iraq;
it is unsuited for shipboard deployment;
and it is hideously expensive. So bad was
its performance, in fact, that Committee
chairman Edolphus Towns (D-N. Y.) called
for a halt to its production, saying “It’s time
to put the Osprey out of its misery.”
Despite a spirited—and sometimes
exasperated—defense by Marine Col.
Karsten S. Heckl, commander of Marine
Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 162 (VMM-
162), one of three squadrons that flew
the MV- 22 in Iraq, the hearings pretty
well demolished whatever credibility the
V- 22 still had. Here are some points that
came to light.
In Iraq, the three MV- 22 squadrons
averaged mission capable rates of 68, 57,
and 61 percent respectively, instead of
the objective of 87 percent, GAO found;
Iraq-based CH-46Es and CH-53s were
averaging 85 percent or better.
Availability was not better fleet-wide.
Only 47 of the 105 Ospreys that the Marine
Corps has bought since 1988 are considered “combat deployable,” and only 22 of
these 47 were ready for combat on a given
day, according to information provided by
the Corps for the hearing.
Indeed, costs are exploding. The V- 22’s
research, development, test and evaluation
costs have tripled since 1988, from $4.2
to $12.7 billion, while the number to be
procured was halved, from nearly 1,000 to
less than 500. And a V- 22 flying hour costs
$11,000, or 140 percent more than the CH-
46E it is intended to replace, the GAO says.
But did it perform well? Lt. Gen.
George J. Trautman, the Marine Corps’
Deputy Commandant for Aviation, noted
with satisfaction during the hearing that
“the three VMM squadrons that have
deployed to Iraq have flown over 9,800
hours while executing more than 6,000
sorties, carrying over 45,000 passengers
and lifting 2. 2 million pounds of cargo.”
But this works out to an average of 7. 5
passengers and 366 lbs load per sortie,
which is pretty dismal performance for an
aircraft costing $93 million.
Operationally, the V- 22 cannot fly
above 10,000 feet, and as it does not have
a weather radar and its ice protection system is unreliable, it is currently prohibited
from flying through known or forecasted
icing conditions. A bit low for Afghanistan,
where it is due to deploy next.
And, although the Marine Corps will
be its largest user, the V- 22 is not suitable
for shipboard deployment. “Ships can carry
fewer V-22s than its predecessor aircraft …
and is only cleared to take off and land from
four of the six operational deck spots of the
LHA- and LHD-class ships usable by CH-
46s.” Furthermore, rotor downwash is dangerous and can blow people off the deck.
Finally, during testimony it emerged
that, to prevent the V- 22’s very hot exhaust
from damaging flight decks while the aircraft idles more than one or two minutes,
sailors are forced to place protective metal
plates under the engine exhausts, and to
reposition them each time it moves.
Congressman Towns summed up
by saying the V- 22 “has problems in hot
weather, it has problems in cold weather,
it has problems with sand, it has problems
with high altitude and it has restricted
maneuverability … we’ve gotten half the
aircraft for three times the cost.”
Clearly, and except for very few, carefully selected missions, the V- 22 is not up
to the job it was designed for. There are
too many things wrong with it to hope
it can be fixed. As it has already cost $29
billion, it would be very wasteful to cancel
the program, but what else to do? Pretend
its shortcomings and faults don’t exist and
then express surprise and regrets when the
next crash kills all aboard? Or when one is
shot down as it lands in a combat zone?
Compared to the flood of money lavished on the banking and mortgage systems,
the Osprey’s $29 billion are just a rounding
error. It’s time to admit the V- 22 is a challenge that hasn’t worked out, and move on
to other technologies that will provide fast,
efficient and affordable medium lift.
